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Common Law and Equity in R3RUE 
Lionel Smith∗ 
Abstract 
One of the most remarked-upon achievements of the first Restatement 
of the Law of Restitution was the consolidation into a single treatment of all 
of the law that concerned the Reporters, whether it came from common law 
or Equity.  In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
(R3RUE), there was initially an even more dramatic idea:  to restate the 
law without even any reference to the historical distinction between 
common law and Equity.  In the final product, however, there are several 
references to the peculiarly Equitable origins of certain juridical solutions 
to the problems addressed by this Restatement.  The goal of this Article is to 
take a critical look at this evolution in the drafting of R3RUE.  Ought the 
Reporter to have kept to the original idea, which would have perfected, in a 
sense, the accomplishment of the first Restatement?  Or, is there a good 
reason to continue to distinguish between common law and Equity, even 
while we know very well that in at least some dimensions, the dichotomy is 
little more than an accident of history?  This Article argues that there are 
some respects in which common law and Equity remain fundamentally and 
substantively different.  For the moment, full fusion therefore rests in a state 
of impossibility.  Fusion is achievable; but the road is rockier than most 
jurists realize.  Some of the differences between common law and Equity 
are profound, and bridging them requires not just translation but also a 
kind of transliteration.  The rewards of such an exercise, however, would be 
rich.  When we can accurately describe and distinguish between the nature 
of an Equitable interest in property and a common law interest in property, 
without using those merely jurisdictional labels, we will be ready to 
comprehend all of private law within a single organizing system. 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ James McGill Professor of Law and Director, Quebec Research Centre of Private 
and Comparative Law, McGill University. 
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I.  Introduction 
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution:  Quasi-Contracts and 
Constructive Trusts1 achieved many things.  One of them was to 
consolidate into a single treatment all of the law that concerned the 
Reporters, whether it came from common law or Equity.2  This was the 
subject of a great deal of positive commentary at the time.3  Andrew Kull 
has shown, in a moving study, that the impetus for this unification came 
from the largely unpublished work of James Barr Ames, and that it was 
built on his deep learning in both the common law and the civil law 
traditions.4  
In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
(R3RUE), there was initially an even more dramatic idea:  to restate the law 
without even any reference to the historical distinction between common 
law and Equity.  In the final product, however, there are several references 
to the peculiarly Equitable origins of certain juridical solutions to the 
problems addressed by this Restatement, namely the law of unjust 
                                                                                                                 
 1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:  QUASI-CONTRACTS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (1937). 
 2. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q.REV. 29, 39–42 (1938).  
In this Article, it is necessary to distinguish the system of legal principles that derive from 
the Court of Chancery, and so are "equitable" in a technical sense, from the wider idea of 
equity which also informs the part of the law of unjust enrichment that finds its origins in the 
common law.  With this goal in mind, Equity and Equitable are used for the former sense, 
while equity and equitable are used for the latter sense. 
 3. See Andrew Kull, Restitution and Reform, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 83, 88 n.17 (2007) 
(collecting citations from contemporary reviews). 
 4. See generally Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of 
Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005). 
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enrichment and the remedies therefor, and the remedies available to take 
away the profits of wrongdoing.5 
The goal of this Article is to take a critical look at this evolution in the 
drafting of R3RUE.  Ought the Reporter to have kept to the original idea, 
which would have perfected, in a sense, the accomplishment of the first 
Restatement?  Or, is there a good reason to continue to distinguish between 
common law and Equity, even while we know very well that, in at least 
some dimensions, the dichotomy is little more than an accident of history?  
This Article argues that there are some respects in which common law and 
Equity remain fundamentally and substantively different.  For the moment, 
full fusion therefore rests in a state of impossibility.  Fusion is achievable; 
but the road is rockier than most jurists realize.  Some of the differences 
between common law and Equity are profound, and bridging them requires 
not just translation but also a kind of transliteration.  The rewards of such 
an exercise, however, would be rich. 
Everyone knows that the incidents of an Equitable interest in property 
are fundamentally different from the incidents of a common law interest in 
property.  For example, in resolving a priority dispute, the classification of 
competing interests as legal or Equitable is an essential first step, for the 
applicable priority rules are different in the two cases.  But those labels are 
merely jurisdictional.  Their continued importance reveals that we are far 
from having a single organizing system.  If we arrived at a point where we 
could describe and discuss legal and Equitable property interests, including 
their creation, characteristics, transfer, and destruction, without using those 
merely jurisdictional labels, we would be ready to comprehend all of 
private law within a single organizing system. 
II.  Theorizing Equity 
The law that comes from Equity has not been as thoroughly theorized 
as the common law.  The nineteenth century saw a flourishing of textbooks 
in the common law world, particularly in England but also in the U.S.  Of 
course, the common law had long had great books, going back to the one 
                                                                                                                 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 4, 24, 45, 63, 
66 (2011).  These Sections make explicit reference to Equity or doctrines characterized as 
Equitable.  However, this does not mean that such doctrines are limited to their traditional 
fields, as will be discussed below.  On the other hand, wholly Equitable doctrines are 
restated without identifying their jurisdictional origins in Sections 55, 57–59. 
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known as Bracton in the thirteenth century, and following through the 
centuries with dozens of works.  Some were justly famous like those of 
Littleton, Coke and Blackstone; many more were less so—less justly 
famous, or less famous, justly or not.  But there was something new in the 
crop of books that appeared in the nineteenth century, in which we find 
Anson, Pollock, Chitty, and Story.  This was a vocation to lead the judges, 
rather than to follow them.  These were books that took it upon themselves 
to order the law in ways that could not be found in the law itself.6  Many of 
their authors were inspired by the developed systems in the civil-law world. 
The timing was not accidental.  The civil law had always been 
systematic in its organization, and the most learned of common lawyers 
knew something, or a great deal, of the civil law.  It is true that, for 
centuries, the systematic nature of the civil law was somewhat 
schizophrenic.  The vast bulk of the civil law was in the Digest, which is 
not systematic at all, and whose ordering is no more logical than the 
alphabetical Abridgements of the medieval common law.  The system of 
the civil law was in the Institutes, those of Justinian and those of Gaius on 
which Justinian’s were modelled.  But the Institutes were an overview, an 
outline with little substance, intended for and primarily used by students.  
The Roman jurists were not systematic in the sense that modern lawyers 
mean by this word; they did not envision their legal system as built up from 
elements (such as consent or will, rights, and obligations), each of which 
could be understood as based upon abstract foundations; they were more 
like early common lawyers, in understanding the law primarily from the 
perspective of the actions available to litigants.7 
Later civilian jurists found other systematic inspiration, and the 
sixteenth century saw the beginning of systematization of the civil law in 
                                                                                                                 
 6. To be fair to Sir William Blackstone, his Commentaries of the late eighteenth 
century certainly did so as well.  Although this work was hugely influential, his scheme for 
ordering all the law in terms of rights and wrongs never gained acceptance.  Blackstone also 
had relatively little to say about Equity, and so his important contribution does not 
undermine my point here.  See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (offering a profound study of Blackstone’s achievement); ALAN 
WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 166–81 (1991) (arguing that Blackstone’s 
system was indirectly derived from Justinian’s Institutes). 
 7. See HENRY S. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883) 
("So great is the ascendency [sic] of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, 
that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of 
procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through . . . its technical forms."). 
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the modern understanding of that idea.8  This systematization developed in 
the succeeding centuries in the hands of great natural lawyers like Hugo 
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and then those of such scholars as Jean 
Domat and Robert-Joseph Pothier; and it reached new heights during the 
nineteenth century, the heyday of codification.  Napoleon’s Civil Code, a 
masterpiece of legislation, came into force in 1804.  To call it a masterpiece 
does not mean that it is flawless, but is only to acknowledge its enormous 
influence in Europe and beyond, and the fact that it remains in force, little 
changed, even while the Republic of France has changed constitutions 
many times during the same period.  The French Civil Code incorporates 
not only the ius commune, derived from the Digest; it also codifies elements 
of local customary laws that were in force, particularly in the north of 
France, at the time of codification.9  But it takes this substance, this blend of 
customary law and ius commune covering all of private law, puts it into a 
deceptively accessible linguistic register, and organizes it according to a 
simple—perhaps too simple—table of contents.  All of private law in a little 
book:  this was an inspiring project.  The Germans would undertake their 
own codification project, conceived rather differently, later in the same 
century.10 
And in the course of that century, there was a development that was 
tremendously important for the intellectual history of the common law.  
This was the abolition of the forms of action.11  The forms of action were 
procedural packages that governed every aspect of the claims of litigants.  
The difference between two forms of action was not just the difference 
between two different kinds of claim.  Two different forms of action might 
have different processes for getting the defendant into court, and different 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Peter Stein, The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law, 90 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 147, 
154 (1995).  Stein identified the French humanist scholars of the sixteenth century as the 
first systematizers:  "For the first time the content of Justinian’s law was separated from its 
form, for the humanist systematisers combined enormous respect for the substance of 
Roman law, with complete disregard for the way it was presented."  Id.  By contrast, JAMES 
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 7–14 (2006) gave pride of place to the contemporaneous Spanish natural law 
school (or late scholastics) as the first systematizers.  "[T]hey were the first to give Roman 
law a theory and a systematic doctrinal structure."  Id. at 9. 
 9. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 87–89 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 10. Id. at 143–57. 
 11. In England, this process was gradual and was not completed until the Judicature 
Acts 1873–1875.  In the United States the crucial first step was the Field Code in New York, 
enacted in 1850, which was adopted in many states and influenced the English reforms. 
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rules for how long the defendant could delay the proceedings.  Crucially, 
they might have different rules for how the plaintiff went about proving his 
claim.  And they might certainly have different rules about what orders the 
court could make, should the plaintiff succeed.  Precedents on one form of 
action were not relevant to another.  Much of the development of the 
common law was in terms, not of whether a plaintiff had a certain right, but 
of whether he could be allowed to use a certain form of action.12  Upon 
their abolition, common lawyers began to think instead in terms of causes 
of action. 
True, Maitland famously said, "The forms of action we have buried, 
but they still rule us from their graves."13  We might imagine that he meant 
little had changed.  This would be a misunderstanding of the event and of 
his interpretation of it.  They still rule us, because all lawyers have to 
categorize grievances; it is the only way to have a legal system based on 
principle rather than instinct.  The abolition of the forms of action gave no 
license to modify the substantive law, and so the learning as to what 
counted as an actionable grievance—the reason for an action, or a "cause of 
action"—did not change.  That is why, still today, people talk about claims 
in replevin or in conversion.  But there was a very important change, in that 
there was now only one law of civil procedure for all claims.  This allowed 
the substantive law to emerge from the civil procedure that had previously 
dominated the attention of jurists.14  In Maitland’s conclusion: 
This results in an important improvement in the statements of the law—
for example in text-books—for the attention is freed from the 
complexity of conflicting and overlapping systems of precedents and 
can be directed to the real problem of what are the rights between man 
and man, what is the substantive law.15 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See generally FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, ALFRED H. CHAYTOR & WILLIAM J. 
WHITTAKER, EQUITY; ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW:  TWO COURSES OF 
LECTURES (1929). 
 13. Id. at 296. 
 14. The law of real property had always been the most systematized part of the law, 
but it was also dominated by procedural considerations, leading as in other fields to the need 
to resort to legal fictions to develop the law.  For an example, see SIR JOHN BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 301–03 (4th ed. 2002). 
 15. MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 375.  Also see the introduction to SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS vi (2d ed. 1890), framed as a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr.:  "The really scientific treatment of principles begins only with the decisions of the last 
fifty years; the development belongs to that classical period of our jurisprudence which in 
England came between the Common Law Procedure Act [1852] and the Judicature Act 
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When those textbooks were written, their authors were frequently 
inspired by the civil law, which, as we have seen, had renewed and 
developed its systematic foundations in the preceding centuries, and in 
particular in the preceding decades.  The very first page of Chitty on 
Contracts16 draws on Roman law and on the French author Robert-Joseph 
Pothier as it discusses the idea of an obligation.17  John Austin developed a 
distinction between primary and secondary rights that was almost certainly 
borrowed from Pothier.18  And the common law of private international 
law, systematized in the same period, uses categories of moveable and 
immovable property that are foreign to the domestic common law but 
fundamental to the civil law.19 
There were textbooks on Equity, too, but there was no systematic civil 
law to which the authors could look.  The civil law has and had an idea of 
equity, of course; but not a body of Equity.20  It should come as no surprise 
that for many decades, the textbooks on Equity did not aspire to lead, but 
only to follow.  They did not systematize, except where the judges did.  
Still today, we have a basic classification of trusts that can only be 
described as bizarre:  express, resulting, and constructive trusts.  It comes 
from the Statute of Frauds, drafted by Lord Nottingham L.C. and enacted in 
                                                                                                                 
[1873]."  The Common Law Procedure Act was one of the crucial steps in the abolition of 
the forms of action. 
 16. See JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT 
UNDER SEAL 1 (2d ed. 1834). 
 17. See WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 4–5 
(1879) (referring to Roman law and to the German jurist Fredrich C. von Savigny in order to 
examine the idea of obligation); FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND 
IN EQUITY 4–5, 10 (2d ed. 1878) (bringing in German law and Roman law to analyze the 
idea of agreement, and noticing French and German law on the question whether we are 
concerned in contract law with subjective intention, or objective manifestations of intention). 
 18. See ROBERT J. POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS § 183 (1761) (distinguishing 
obligations primitives from obligations secondaires in the context of contractual penalty 
clauses).  These became primary and secondary obligations in the hands of William D. 
Evans, one of Pothier’s most influential translators into English.  Bernard Rudden, 
Correspondence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 288, 288 (1990).  Austin expanded the idea of 
primary rights to the extracontractual context, although he preferred "sanctioning" right to 
"secondary" right.  JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 45–46 (4th ed. 1873). 
 19. See ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS:  A CASE STUDY IN 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 93 (1992); Blaine Baker, Interstate Choice of Law and Early-American 
Constitutional Nationalism:  An Essay on Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, 38 
MCGILL L.J. 454 (1993). 
 20. See supra note 2 for the distinction between Equity and equity in this Article. 
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1677.21  Only recently, one might say in the last twenty years, do we see 
books on Equity and trusts that look critically at their subject matter, and do 
not simply describe what the courts do, but ask whether it can be made 
sense of.  And these are not the leading texts, most of which originated in 
the nineteenth century and have been through multiple editions; they are 
newer books.  The leading texts on Equity and trusts, those with a pedigree 
of over a century, tend to avoid systematization.22  The same phenomenon 
is evident in relation to private international law:  the common law of 
private international law was inspired and informed by the civil law, but the 
civil law does not have Equity, and only very recently has there been 
thought given to what might be the rules for choice of law in relation to 
many doctrines of Equity.23  Much of the early work of that genius of 
analytical jurisprudence, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, was inspired by a 
desire to understand the relationship between common law and Equity.24  
Arguably, however, he never quite came to the point of using his justly 
famous fundamental legal conceptions to analyze the nature of the 
beneficiary’s interest under a trust.25  This was a subject that preoccupied 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Lionel Smith, Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
294, 297–98 (1999). 
 22. See RODERICK P. MEAGHER, JOHN D. HEYDON, & MARK J. LEEMING, MEAGHER, 
GUMMOW, AND LEHANE’S EQUITY DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES (4th ed. 2002) (showing an 
entirely self-conscious reactionism, especially in the Preface, to late 20th century projects of 
systematizing Equity).  This book does not have 19th century roots; its first edition dates 
from 1975.  The state of New South Wales, however, where the book was published, did not 
enact the Judicature Act reform, combining the administration of the common law with that 
of Equity, until 1972.  The book, therefore, reflects a pre-Judicature approach to Equity. 
 23. See generally, e.g., TIONG MIN YEO, CHOICE OF LAW FOR EQUITABLE DOCTRINES 
(2004).  The choice of law rules for trusts are better developed in the United States than 
elsewhere in the common law world, via the Restatements of the American Law Institute. 
 24. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 
537, 537–572 (1913).  
 25. See id. at 555–56 (touching on the subject, but only through the use of some 
examples, and not engaging the question occupying so many of his contemporaries—
whether the beneficiary’s right was in rem or in personam); see also Wesley N. Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 
20 (1913).  Hohfeld states:  "A later article will deal specially with the analysis of certain 
typical and important interests of a complex character—more particularly trusts and other 
equitable interests."  In that second article, Hohfeld mainly developed the idea of "paucital 
rights" and "multital rights" as his elucidation of the best way to understand the distinction 
between rights in personam and rights in rem.  See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).  He did show, at 
the very end, that beneficiaries’ rights are multital (in rem).  Id. at 763–66.  This passage is 
marked, however, by some confusion, as Hohfeld treats the holder of a legal contingent 
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legal thought in his day, and that is now attracting further attention as legal 
scholars seek, finally, to theorize the law of trusts in a way that will allow it 
to be understood as part of the same system that incorporates the rest of 
private law.26 
III.  Equity and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment started 
with what might be called a radical fusionist project, in which the language 
of Equity would disappear.  The final text represents a more modest project.  
My argument to this point is that systematizing Equity is unfinished 
business.  In other words, the field of Equity (and particularly of the law of 
trusts) has not been described in the kind of juristic language that is used to 
describe all the rest of private law.  To talk of "equitable interests" is to 
describe something with a purely historical label.  This observation helps us 
to understand why, in some parts of the common law world (although not 
so much in the United States), there is a live issue about the fusion of 
common law and Equity:  whether it is a good idea, whether it is even 
possible.27  It may seem very odd to some lawyers that anyone would 
question fusion.  But fusion skepticism has more than one foundation.  It is 
based partly on logic.  The fusion of common law and Equity was a 
procedural step.  No one’s substantive rights were changed by any fusion of 
the courts.  Moreover, there is a very real sense in which the mission of 
Equity is precisely to differ from the common law because Equity has 
always been understood as, in some sense, corrective of the common law.  
                                                                                                                 
remainder alongside a trust beneficiary.  Id.  He fails to engage fully with the difficult point 
that a trust beneficiary does not generally have any claim against a tortfeasor who damages 
the trust property, and ultimately says that "[t]he nature of the equitable rights, privileges, 
powers, and immunities of the cestui que trust is too large a subject for adequate treatment in 
the present place; and so any further consideration of that interesting subject must be 
reserved for another occasion."  Id. at 766.  However, Hohfeld died in 1918.  Note that the 
two Yale Law Journal articles were later published as a book, of which there are several 
editions such as W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING (1964). 
 26. See generally, e.g., Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALBERTA 
L. REV. 173 (1999); Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4 
J. EQUITY 1 (2010); Lionel Smith, Unravelling Proprietary Restitution, 40 CANADIAN BUS. 
L.J. 317 (2004). 
 27. There was a conference on the subject in Sydney in 2004, leading to the 
publication of SIMONE DEGELING & JAMES EDELMAN, EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW (2005). 
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Hence, a substantive fusion would seem to contradict the reason for which 
Equity arose.  Substantive fusion, though, can be understood in different 
ways.  Just as the procedural abolition of the forms of action at common 
law led to the systematization of that legal order,28 so too the procedural 
fusion of law and Equity arguably requires their conceptual integration into 
a single legal order.  This may point in the direction of a kind of fusion that 
requires all of the private law to be made sense of within a single 
conceptual framework; the doctrines of Equity will survive, but our 
understanding of them will be more systematic.  Fusion skepticism is also 
based on conservatism:  the preservation of the distinctness of Equity is 
important to many.29  This conservatism plays out in many ways, including 
in how the subject is taught in law faculties.30 
In this Section, I will seek to assess the fusion project in the R3RUE 
via two three-fold classifications of Equity:  an old and well-established 
one, that dates, it seems, from the eighteenth century; and a new one, 
recently proposed by Andrew Burrows to organize our thinking about 
fusion.31 
The old classification seems to have originated with John 
Fonblanque’s notes in his annotated editions of the eighteenth century 
Treatise of Equity attributed to Henry Ballow, although it was adopted and 
popularized by Joseph Story and others.32  In this sense, it is a rare example 
of a scheme of systematization of Equity that did not come from the courts.  
It divides the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery into three parts:  original 
or exclusive, concurrent, and auxiliary.  The original jurisdiction refers to 
situations where the plaintiff’s only right is Equitable.  The rights of a 
beneficiary under a trust are the clearest example.  The plaintiff typically 
has no right at all at common law, and if he does not have an Equitable 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 19 
(Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005). 
 30. It was Maitland’s comment on how Equity should be taught that engaged the 
attention of Hohfeld.  See Hohfeld, supra note 24, at 537–40.  Maitland’s famous book was 
not written as a book but is based on student notes from his series of law school lectures.  
Supra note 12.  Today, there are still books and law school courses entitled Equity in some 
places, but not in others. 
 31. See Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity, 22 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). 
 32. See Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 664–
66 (2007) (offering a brief history of the classification, which was challenged and modified 
by many authors). 
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recourse then he has nothing at all.  The concurrent jurisdiction refers to the 
case where the plaintiff has a legal right and yet goes to Equity for some 
remedy that the common law cannot provide.  Injunctions and specific 
performance are the core examples.33  The plaintiff has a common law right 
that the defendant perform his contractual promise, or that the defendant 
stay off the plaintiff’s land; but the common law deals almost exclusively in 
damages, and so the plaintiff may go to Equity for those remedies that 
command the defendant to do or not to do something other than the 
payment of money.  The auxiliary jurisdiction is a bit more obscure, and 
refers primarily to pretrial procedure.  Even in relation to a lawsuit at 
common law, the Court of Chancery could order the production of 
documents, which common law courts could not.  Pretrial discovery of 
documents, and a great deal else of our modern civil procedure, comes from 
the Chancery. 
The classification has not been a particularly successful one and little 
is heard of it today, but in one respect it focuses attention on an important 
point.  Some, but only some, of the recourses provided by Equity are, to this 
day, discretionary.  Specific performance is a good example.  This 
discretionary character can be made sense of, at least in part, inasmuch as 
the plaintiff has a right to compensatory damages whether or not she is able 
to secure a decree of specific performance.  For the same reason, in relation 
to such decrees, the orthodox principle is that the plaintiff has to show that 
the common law recourse, which by hypothesis is available, is in some way 
inadequate.  This leads some people to generalize, to the effect that there is 
something inherently discretionary about Equity, or that Equitable remedies 
only arise where common law remedies are inadequate.  But neither of 
these ideas has any relevance in the exclusive jurisdiction.  There is no 
whiff of judicial discretion anywhere in the basic principles of the law of 
express trusts; it is all a matter of rights.34  And this is not surprising, 
inasmuch as if Equity does not help a trust beneficiary, she typically has no 
possibility of common law recourse. 
The other three-fold classification, posited by Andrew Burrows, is not 
intended simply as a way of organizing the jurisdiction of Equity, but as a 
way of organizing a project of substantive (and not merely procedural) 
fusion between the common law and Equity.  Burrows divides the private 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Others might include subrogation and marshalling. 
 34. Unless the terms of the trust create discretions, a state of affairs which has become 
the norm; but this is discretion in the trustees, not the court. 
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law—the common law and Equity together—into three areas.  The first is 
the field in which the common law and Equity coexist coherently, and in 
which retaining separate labels still provides "the best or, at least, useful 
terminology."35  In this category he places the trust, and also "the general 
priority rule that a bona fide purchaser for value of a legal interest without 
notice takes free of a prior equitable interest in the same property."36  As he 
notes, it is difficult to describe this rule without using the labels "common 
law" and "equitable" to categorize the interests held by the competing 
parties, because the rule is based on precisely such a categorization. 
Burrows’s second category covers situations where, as in the first 
category, the common law and Equity coexist coherently, but unlike in the 
first category, the traditional designations of "common law" and "equitable" 
are superfluous.  One of his examples is the subject of threats or pressure 
that induce a contract or gift and may allow it to be set aside.  The common 
law always had a doctrine of duress; Equity added the idea of undue 
influence, allowing some transactions to be set aside that the common law 
would not.  But, he argues, nothing is gained by perpetuating the historical 
labels.  We might as well just list all the threats or pressure that allow a 
transaction to be avoided.  Although he does not specifically place it in this 
category, the law of specific performance and injunctions seems to belong 
here as well.  We might formulate the traditional sentence, "where the 
defendant has breached a contract, the plaintiff has a right to compensatory 
damages at common law; but in Equity, as a matter of discretion, he may 
get a decree of specific performance."  This proposition could be 
reformulated, "where the defendant has breached a contract, the plaintiff 
has a right to compensatory damages; but, as a matter of discretion, he may 
get a decree of specific performance."  This category, one might say, lends 
itself easily to a kind of terminological fusion, without any effect on the 
substance of the law.37 
Burrows’s third category comprises situations in which, in his view, 
the common law and Equity are different, at least slightly so, and, unlike in 
the first category, this difference is not a useful or justifiable one.38  The 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Burrows, supra note 31, at 5. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Of course not everyone would agree with this.  The traditional position would be 
that the retention of the label "Equitable" keeps the jurisdiction to award specific 
performance in intellectual contact with the whole body of Equity, which has its own 
internal logic. 
 38. Burrows, supra note 31, at 6–7.  
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result is that in this third category, the common law and Equity do not 
coexist coherently.  The differences need to be ironed out.  Substantive 
fusion is needed.  Burrows gives many examples, including the law on 
compound interest (which in English law is only available for Equitable 
claims), and the law of tracing (which in English law is thought by many to 
differ as between "common law tracing" and "Equitable tracing").39  As 
Burrows acknowledges, the difference between his first and third categories 
is a matter of judgement:  if one believes that there is a good justification 
for a difference between the common law and Equity, one will place the 
matter in the first category, otherwise in the third.40 
Although he does not mention the older classification, it is interesting 
to observe that Burrows’s first category, where he would provisionally 
accept that the law remain in its traditional state, lines up closely, if not 
exactly, with the "exclusive" jurisdiction of that older classification.  
Similarly, even those who are critical of the coherence of the older 
classification are likely to accept that there is a crucial distinction between 
the exclusive jurisdiction and the rest of Equity.41 
If we assess the fusion project of the R3RUE against Burrows’s 
classification, we can speculate that he would approve of a great deal of 
what is accomplished by the new Restatement.  Perhaps exemplifying 
Burrows’s second category, we see duress and undue influence brought 
together in Sections 14 through 15 without any references to the legal or 
Equitable origins of one or the other.42  Similarly, the R3RUE restates the 
law of mistake in Sections 5 through 12 and 34 without reference to 
common law or Equity.  It goes so far as to overturn, in some cases, the 
traditional doctrine that neither common law nor Equity will perfect an 
imperfect gift.  Again, Section 13 restates the law of fraud and 
misrepresentation, bringing together the law of fraud (that comes from the 
common law) and the law of innocent misrepresentation (that comes from 
Equity).  Subrogation, most of which comes from Equity, is restated in 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 7.  But see LIONEL SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 174 (1997); Lionel Smith, 
Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds, 125 L.Q. REV. 338 (2009). 
 40. For example, Burrows suggests that an example of his third category is the 
inconsistent treatment, in law and Equity, of misappropriated money (Burrows, supra note 
31, at 7 n.26), but he has already placed the law of trusts in the first category, which suggests 
that it is justifiable that the rights of a legal owner of money will not necessarily be the same 
as the rights of a beneficiary of a trust or a legatee under an estate. 
 41. MEAGHER, HEYDON, & LEEMING, supra note 22, at 10–11. 
 42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 14–15 (2011). 
1198 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185 (2011) 
Sections 24 and 57 in a way that uses the word "equitable" (Section 24 is 
labelled "equitable subrogation") but that does not depend on any 
jurisdictional distinctions for its content or the scope of its applicability. 
Other elements of R3RUE could be said to illustrate Burrows’s third 
category.  That is, there are provisions that bring the common law 
substantively in line with Equity, in situations where, at least on some 
views of the law, there was traditionally a difference between them.  Taking 
some elements from among Burrows’s examples, we find that the law 
relating to illegality43 and tracing44 are restated in a unified way.45  Perhaps 
the strongest example is the restatement of the "unclean hands" doctrine in 
Section 63.  It is labelled "Equitable disqualification (unclean hands)," but it 
is made to apply to any claim.  This is a significant development from the 
traditional position, according to which the doctrine applies only to the 
enforcement of Equitable rights. 
Finally, let us come to Burrows’s first category.  Here Burrows argues 
that the common law and Equity coexist coherently and the labels do need 
to be perpetuated.  Above, it was suggested that this category corresponds 
to the original or exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional classification, 
where a claimant has a purely Equitable right.  The R3RUE in some ways 
reflects Burrows’s position.  One of his examples of this category is the 
defence by which the purchase in good faith of a legal interest in property, 
for value, without notice of a pre-existing Equitable interest, will defeat that 
interest.  We see this defence restated in Section 66, with explicit reference 
to the legal (common law) and Equitable natures of the respective 
interests.46 
Burrows’s other example of his first category is the law of trusts, and 
here the R3RUE presents some difficult questions.  On the traditional view, 
the trust belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of Equity.  A trust is an 
obligation relating to the benefit of particular property, however that 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. § 32. 
 44. Id. §§ 58–59.  
 45. Although some would argue that even in England and the rest of the common law 
world, there is only one law of tracing.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 46. Conversely, the defence in Section 67 is for payments of money, where the 
common law provided a good faith purchase defence that would defeat legal interests, 
although it did not provide one for transfers of other kinds of property.  The common law 
defence always had different rules about what counted as value; in particular, a promise to 
pay money is value at common law, but not for the purpose of the Equitable defence.  The 
R3RUE has apparently diminished protection of Equitable interests by restating value in 
Section 68 in line with the common law defence. 
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obligation may arise.  If it arises by consent, it is an express trust; if it arises 
by operation of law, it is a resulting or constructive trust.47  United States 
law has for many years taken the position that the constructive trust is not 
really a trust at all; it is only a remedy, explained by analogy to the law of 
trusts.48  This view is echoed in R3RUE, where it restates constructive 
trusts in Section 55.  There it is suggested that not only is the constructive 
trust not a trust; it is not even a remedy, but only "a manner of speaking."49 
The suggestion that a constructive trust is not a trust is difficult to 
understand if we note that it is, like all trusts, a relationship between people 
with respect to property that arises out of the obligation of the owner of the 
property to hold it for the benefit of the beneficiary.  It is easier to 
understand if we take a narrower definition of trust, that confines the word 
"trust" to expressly created trusts.50  This is the view that seems to lie 
behind such rhetorical devices as the claim that a constructive trust is no 
more a trust than a quasi-contract is a contract.  But the word "constructive" 
indicates clearly that the constructive trust does not arise by a settlor’s 
intention.  The better formulation is that in the Restatement of the Law of 
Restitution:  Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts—a constructive trust 
differs from an express trust in much the same way as a quasi-contractual 
obligation differs from a contractual obligation.51 
This seems exactly right:  both a contractual obligation and a quasi-
contractual obligation are obligations, but only the former arises by consent, 
while the latter, by operation of law.  So too, both the express and 
constructive trusts are trusts, with trust property, trustees, and beneficiaries, 
whose equitable interest gives them priority in the case of trustee 
insolvency to the extent that trust property can be found.  One arises by 
consent, one by operation of law. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Ben McFarlane, The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting Trusts, in 
CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING TRUSTS 183 (C. Mitchell ed., 2009). 
 48. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:  QUASI-CONTRACTS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 160 cmt. a (1937); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 401 (1993); 
1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON 
TRUSTS § 2.1.1 (2006) (citing and following the Restatements of the Law of Trusts).  Unlike 
previous editions, Scott and Ascher on Trusts no longer deals with constructive trusts. 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b 
(2011). 
 50. This view is not significantly different from the view that a trust must 
definitionally be a fiduciary relationship. 
 51. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:  QUASI-CONTRACTS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 160 (1937). 
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If the claim that a constructive trust is not a real trust is merely a way 
of saying that it does not arise by consent, then no one would disagree with 
the conclusion, even if they might disagree with the terminology.  But there 
is a way of understanding the claim that is importantly different, and that 
arises out of the suggestion that a constructive trust is "only a remedy."  
That can be understood as the idea that its grant lies in the discretion of the 
court, and it belongs conceptually not with express trusts, but with 
injunctions and specific performance.52  In terms of the old classification of 
Equity jurisdiction, this means that the constructive trust should not belong 
in the exclusive jurisdiction, but in the concurrent jurisdiction.  In modern 
terms, this is just another way of saying that you do not get it as a matter of 
right, but as a matter of discretion.  And many cases, including many recent 
cases, have accepted this vision of the "remedial constructive trust."  The 
trust is awarded in the discretion of the court, when it is shown that other 
remedies are inadequate.53 
But there is a paradox here, in that this proves too much, or at least 
more than the Reporter of the R3RUE, Andrew Kull, wishes to prove.  The 
implication of the remedial view of constructive trusts, which lines them up 
with injunctions and decrees of specific performance, is that, like 
injunctions and decrees of specific performance, they are created by the 
order of the judge.  They do not exist before that time.  This contrasts with 
the view of constructive trusts that sees them as obligations with respect to 
the benefit of property, arising by operation of law from unjust enrichment 
or some other cause.  On that view, the trust arises when the obligation 
arises.  This has enormous implications in bankruptcy.  If a defendant 
holding the contested property has become bankrupt, and before the 
moment of bankruptcy, he held that property in trust, then the property does 
not form part of the bankruptcy estate.  That is the law everywhere.  But if 
the property does form part of the bankruptcy estate because it is not held in 
trust, and a plaintiff appears before the judge and asks for an injunction that 
the property be transferred to him, then the plaintiff appears not in the role 
                                                                                                                 
 52. The analogy is drawn explicitly in the R3RUE.  Section 55 Comment b indicates 
that an order recognizing a constructive trust is a composite of a declaration and an 
injunction.  See Andrew Kull, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 40 CANDADIAN BUS. 
L.J. 358, 360 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Conctractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625, 631 (1995) (describing the constructive trust as "a species of equitable 
remedy, comparable in function to the injunction or the decree of specific performance"). 
 53. The Supreme Court of Canada has certainly accepted this view.  See, e.g., Kerr v. 
Baranow, 2011 S.C.C. 10. 
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of trust beneficiary; rather, he appears in the role of a creditor seeking to be 
promoted above the others.  His request will surely be denied because 
bankruptcy seeks to treat all creditors equally.  And if a constructive trust is 
nothing but a kind of injunction, then the plaintiff who appears seeking a 
constructive trust can expect to be treated in exactly the same way.54 
Andrew Kull wants constructive trusts to provide priority in 
bankruptcy, just as Austin Scott did.55  This presupposes that the plaintiff’s 
trust interest exists before the bankruptcy.56  But this is precisely the 
traditional or institutional view of constructive trusts, and on this view it is 
very difficult to see what is left of the idea that the constructive trust is "just 
a remedy."  Kull’s view seems to be that the constructive trust arises from 
the facts that create it, such as an unjust enrichment, and not from the court 
order.  The court order is only a declaration of what already exists.  Again, 
this is just like the traditional or institutional view of the constructive trust.  
Kull’s understanding of the idea that the constructive trust is "just a 
remedy" remains true, he argues, in the sense that the court’s order settles 
what was otherwise a disagreement between the parties regarding what was 
the pre-existing state of affairs.57  But this seems to mean that everything on 
which a court passes judgment is just a remedy.  Who owns an asset?  Did a 
corporation exist?  Was an express trust, or a contract, created?  Did the 
defendant owe a duty of care, and if so, did he breach it?  All these are 
questions as to which there might be a disagreement that only a court can 
settle.  If this means they are all remedies, then the label does not tell us 
much.  "Remedy," it has been shown, is a word with very many meanings.58 
                                                                                                                 
 54. For a well-known U.S. example, see In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th 
Cir. 1994).  A Canadian example is Bedard v. Schell, 59 Sask. R. 71 (Q.B. 1987). 
 55. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy:  Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 287 n.54 (1998) (citing AUSTIN SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.4 (4th 
ed. 2004)). 
 56. See id. at 287. 
 57. Id.  
 58. See Birks, supra note 6 (identifying five distinct senses of the word "remedy").  
Indeed if the fact that a court passes judgment on a matter in dispute makes that matter or 
that order a remedy, then even questions of fact would be remedies, or disputes about facts 
would be resolved by remedies. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
The contributions of Equity to the modern law are enormously 
important.  To say nothing of all of the law of trusts, it has given us 
equitable liens, subrogation, tracing, discovery, and much else.  The 
integration of Equity and the common law is something that seems overdue 
to many commentators.  The R3RUE, like Andrew Burrows, takes the line 
that this is a process that should have happened long ago, and that we 
should move it along as quickly as can be.  In my own view, that project is 
premature.  We cannot integrate the common law and Equity until we have 
systematized Equity.  We cannot put any Equitable doctrine into one of 
Burrows’s categories until we understand it fully, and understand how it 
relates to the neighbouring common law.  It may be—and this would have 
been Maitland’s view—that almost all of our law actually belongs in 
Burrows’s second category. 
The law of constructive trusts serves only as the most telling 
illustration of this point.  A legal realist approach led to the idea that it was 
naïve to think that constructive trusts were really trusts.  They were pushed 
aside and treated as remedies.  Not surprisingly, after decades of academic 
commentary saying that they were not trusts but only remedies, some courts 
took the view that they were not trusts but only remedies.  This has led to 
confusion and injustice.  It has also led, in the United States, to the ejection 
of constructive trusts from the subject of trust law, which is a mistake.  
Constructive trusts give beneficiaries priority in the insolvency of the 
trustee because constructive trusts are trusts.  Terminology always matters 
in the law. 
A task for the future will be to analyze trusts—all of the law of 
trusts—as carefully and as fully as we have analyzed the law of restitution 
for unjust enrichment and the law of gain-based remedies for wrongful 
conduct.  Hohfeld started the job, and we need to finish it.  The ultimate 
result will be that we could, if we wanted to, describe all of the law of trusts 
in a precise juridical terminology that would not depend on historical 
distinctions between the common law and Equity.  We could preserve the 
substance, influence and genius of Equity even while dispensing with the 
historical terminology that has been handed down to us.  And this would, if 
we wished it, allow us to achieve the unfulfilled goal of the R3RUE, to 
restate any body of law without reference to the labels "common law" and 
"Equity." 
